Let’s talk about religion, politics…and mentoring

by Jean Rhodes

We are living through one of the most bitterly partisan periods in history. We can all sense it, and a series of studies conducted Pew Research Center over the past few years document widening divides between Democrats and Republicans on the economy, racial justice, climate change, immigration, law enforcement, foreign aid, and more. There are many reasons–from partisan media, divisive political rhetoric, and even deeply rooted cultural, historical and regional divides–all of which are compounded by a rigid, two-party electoral system. These divisions have become even more pronounced as identities (racial, religious, sexual, etc) become closely aligned with political identities. And, as we prepare to head into another presidential election, these trends are heightened.

But what about support for mentoring programs and willingness to serve as a mentor? The recent MENTOR summit in DC seemed to encompass a wide political and religious spectrum, suggesting that mentoring may represent the rare common ground that can transcend these divides. In a recent study, Matt Hagler, Sam McQuillin, and I set out to explore whether support for federal spending on mentoring programs and people’s willingness to serve as volunteers differed as a function of their political and religious beliefs. Below is a brief summary of what we found, summarized and excerpted from Ideological profiles of US adults and their support for youth mentoring programs, Journal of Community Psychology. 

Background

Political opinions tend to track with attitudes about spending on family and youth programs. Conservative political attitudes are typically associated with support for limited governmental oversight and lower spending on social programs. By contrast, liberal political attitudes tend to be associated with support for greater governmental involvement and higher spending on social programs. Those who identify as liberal also tend to support social change and social justice movements, while conservatives typically support the status quo.

But there are prominent examples of conservative politicians offering moral and fiscal support for youth mentoring (e.g., Colin Powell, George W. Bush). By some interpretations of US conservatism, his support for mentoring may not constitute ideological conflict at all. Conservatives may see mentoring as a way of addressing inequality by helping young people “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” one relationship at a time rather than investing in government spending on welfare, universal healthcare, higher education, etc.

Conservative ideology and religiosity may also influence the extent to which adults are willing to give up their time to volunteer in mentoring programs. Some studies have suggested that political conservatives are more charitable with their time and money (e.g., Brooks, 2006), though most studies show that this association is driven less by politics than by the fact that conservatives tend to be more religiously involved than liberals. Volunteerism is core to the teachings of most major religions, and many religious organizations encourage (and provide opportunities for) their members to volunteer. Thus, religiosity may be the driving force in conservatives’ ideological support for youth programs.

Our study

To examine associations among political ideology, religiosity, and attitudes toward youth mentoring programs , we drew on data from MENTOR’s Power of Relationships Study led by Mike Garringer (N = 1,700). Latent class analysis (LCA) was used to identify underlying ideological profiles of US adults and the extent to which attitudes toward mentoring were associated with membership in latent ideological classes.

Three groups emerged from our analyses:

Classic Conservatives (n = 426) were characterized by modest religious affinity and majority conservative ideology. Classic Conservatives were also the oldest (average age > 45) and the wealthiest group. No one in this class agreed or strongly agreed with support for social justice movements and slightly over half felt like the country was headed in the wrong direction.

Progressives (n = 963) reported low religious affinity (approximately 70% endorsed no or little affinity) and endorsed moderate or liberal political ideology. The Progressives were younger than the Classic Conservatives and reported the lowest income. This class overwhelmingly felt the country is headed in the wrong direction (i.e., >78%) and showed modest support for social justice movements (i.e., >57%).

Religious Outsiders (n = 205) had strong religious affinity (approximately 90% endorsing some or strong religious affinity) and strong conservative identity (approximately 90% moderately or strongly conservative). The Religious Outsiders were the youngest group.  Interestingly, this group showed strong support for social justice movements (i.e., >85%). Compared to the other two groups, Religious Outsiders displayed significantly more  support for both the importance of mentoring and the need for federal investment in mentoring compared to the other two groups. What’s more, the Religious Outsider participation in formal mentoring programs significantly exceeded that of both Classic Conservatives and Progressives.

Overall, despite relatively lower support by older, traditional conservatives, there appears to be a younger generation of self‐identified conservatives who are very enthusiastic about mentoring, including government funding for programs and volunteering. In other words, governmental support for mentoring might be one important area of potential bipartisan collaboration during this period of unprecedented partisanship.